



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

Op-3224/aab
Per 3231/001260

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

From: Director of Naval Intelligence.
To: Director of Central Intelligence,

25X1A9A

Subj: NIE-32 - Effects of Operations in Korea on the Chinese Communist Regime.

1. This constitutes ONI contributions to subject paper. The material is submitted in summary form rather than in detail. The summary in each case contains ONI's overall conclusion and evaluation of the many reports from different sources.

2. In answering the question under section III, A, losses which are largely North Korean, such as bridges, railroad yards, etc., have been eliminated. Most losses from Naval surface bombardment are in this category. These figures can be made available.

3. Answers to questions in the terms of reference follow:

I. A. - There is no evidence regarding the development by the Korean War of disagreements or cleavages among the higher echelons of the Chinese Communist Navy command.

III. A. - There is no evidence of Chinese Communist Naval losses in the Korean War.

Claimed cumulative losses inflicted on the Chinese Communists and North Koreans by U.S. Navy carrier and patrol planes, marine carrier based aircraft, and British carrier based aircraft are as follows:

	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Aircraft	83	86
Tanks	147	131
Artillery Positions	257	265
Trucks and other Vehicles	2,471	1,519
Locomotives	212	225
Railroad Cars	974	2,212
Small Craft	305	700
Ammunition and Supply Dumps	178	90

Review of this document by CIA has determined that

- ☒ CIA has no objection to declass
☐ It contains information of CIA interest that must remain classified at

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	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Carts	739	407
Freighters	3	2
Pack Animals	770 (killed)	—
Machine Gun and Mortar Positions	180	72
Oil Tankers	1	—
Trains (complete)	9	1h
Troop Concentrations	1,194	
Troops	33,445 (killed)	

III. B. - There is evidence that total CCN personnel strength is probably now in excess of the 13,000 figure previously carried by ONI, and undoubtedly well in excess of requirements for current inshore patrol operations. It is considered that most of these patrol operations are not essential security missions; hence redeployment of CCN units would probably be limited chiefly by logistic factors, with the need for maintaining present security patrols only a secondary consideration. This condition would naturally be reversed in the event of the resumption or anticipated resumption of Nationalist activity against the coast.

III. C. - There is no evidence concerning the number and types of uncommitted CCN vessels or of uncommitted naval personnel.

There is little evidence concerning the quality and state of training of CCN personnel. However, despite Soviet training assistance, the bulk of CCN personnel probably are deficient in both technical training and seamanship by Western standards. It is possible that the CCN now has a limited number of personnel qualified in submarines. It is improbable that the present state of training of these personnel, particularly in attack training and tactical and strategic doctrine, is such that they could wage effective submarine warfare.

III. D. - Many reports from different sources indicating that naval training is being carried on by the Soviets in China have been received. Apparently a good proportion of the training is in submarine operations which is likely since the Soviets are very submarine conscious and China could well assist the Soviet effort by operating submarines. Also, it is very probable that a good deal of minelaying tactics are being taught to the Chinese Communists since this is a means of warfare in which the Soviets excel.

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
Many reports indicate that training emphasis is placed on amphibious operations. Training schools are believed to exist in or near Tsingtao, Dairen, Whampoa, Shanghai, and Yulin, and scattered reports indicate training establishments, possibly temporary stations for practice maneuvers, at several other points. There is not much evidence regarding training in the fundamentals of seamanship and naval combat.

III. E. - There are no reported defections from the CCN attributable to the Korean War.

III. F. - All the evidence indicates that the CCN is fully mobilized.

III. G. - There are indications that the Soviets are now engaged in building a submarine force for the Chinese Communist Navy and that from one to six old or small submarines have already been transferred to the Chinese Communists.

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The Soviets are assisting the Chinese Communist Navy with advisors, technicians and training personnel.

It has been reported that the Chinese Communists received 2,000 contact mines from the Soviets, and it is believed that the assembly base is at Shanghai.

R. F. STOUT,
by direction.

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- 3 -

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